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A
mAbstract
We study the transitions from career to gradual and permanent retirement by a
sample of (Continental) European males aged 55 to 70 in the late 2000s. We find
that only 14.6% of the workers in this sample moved from a career to a bridge job
by the time of the interview, much less than in the United States, where this share is
estimated at close to 60%. We use the cross country and time variation in
employment protection legislation and minimum retirement age to study whether
recent changes in these labour market institutions have had any effect on the
transitions out of career jobs. We find that policies that have increased minimum
retirement age and reduced the strictness of employment protection legislation have
raised the hazard into gradual retirement in Northern and Central European
countries and the permanence in career jobs in Mediterranean countries.
JEL codes: J26, J11, J21
Keywords: Retirement; Europe; Bridge jobs; Pension reformsIntroduction
The traditional view on the transition from work to retirement of older men has been
that continuous work is followed by abrupt permanent retirement. The empirical evi-
dence, however, suggests that this transition is often more gradual, and involves either
a reduction of working hours in the same job (phased retirement) or the transition
from a “career job” to one or more transitional jobs, or “bridge jobs” (partial retirement),
as a preliminary step to ultimate withdrawal from the labour force.
Gradual retirement has both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, less
demanding jobs can increase the job satisfaction and utility of older workers at the end
of their employment trajectories, and induce people with valuable skills and experience
to work longer, thereby reducing alternative transitions to retirement such as disability
and unemployment. By virtue of this, labour supply increases, and the sustainability of
pension systems improves. On the other hand, the availability of part-time or less de-
manding jobs for older workers may be hampered by the presence of fixed employer
costs and by other restrictions, including the production technology, the difficulty of
job scheduling in the case of part-time jobs and labour market institutions that dis-
courage labour turnover.
By and large, the existing evidence on gradual retirement patterns is based on US
data and research. Less has been done to understand whether similar patterns apply to
European labour markets (one notable exception being Kantarci and Van Soest, 2008).
This paper contributes to the empirical literature in two directions. First, we useBrunello and Langella; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
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to present new evidence on gradual retirement patterns and the diffusion of bridge jobs
in Continental Europe. Second, we investigate whether the probability of transiting
from a career to a bridge job in Europe has been affected by the changes in minimum
retirement age and in the strictness of employment protection legislation that have oc-
curred in several European countries during the 1990s and the 2000s.
These institutional changes have the potential of influencing the labour market tran-
sitions of older workers. On the one hand, less restrictive employment protection can
affect the hazard into bridge jobs and retirement because it increases the availability of
short-term contracts with shorter working hours, and reduces at the same time the
costs of terminating permanent (career) jobs. On the other hand, higher minimum re-
tirement age which delays retirement can induce individuals who wish to consume ad-
ditional leisure and cannot permanently retire to switch from more demanding career
jobs to bridge jobs. Furthermore, when the increase in minimum retirement age is
unexpected, job losers may be forced to find a short term job instead than early
retirement1.
We use the retrospective information provided by the third wave of SHARE – the
Survey on Health, Age and Retirement in Europe - to reconstruct the labour market
transitions from age 50 onwards by males aged 55 to 70, who held a career job (defined
as a full-time job lasting more than 10 years) at age 50. We find that 8.86% of the indi-
viduals in our sample have transited from a career to a bridge job and eventually to re-
tirement, 0.71% have retained their career job but switched from full to part-time,
51.53% have transited directly from a career job to permanent retirement and the
remaining 38.90% are still in their career job. We also highlight that the traditional
patterns of retirement – from a career job to permanent withdrawal from the labour
force – is much more frequent in Mediterranean Europe (Italy, France and Spain) than
in Northern and Central Europe (Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Netherlands, Belgium,
Denmark and Sweden).
These results suggest that partial retirement is less common in Continental Europe
than in the US or Japan, where it involves the majority of older male workers2, and that
phased retirement involving a switch from full to part-time work is very rare with the
same employer3. Since bridge jobs are more likely be part-time than career jobs, we
conclude that older European workers willing to switch from full to part-time work
typically have to change employer4.
Using a sample of men who were holding a full-time career job at age 50, we estimate
a multinomial logit model of competing risks, with hazards into gradual and permanent
retirement, to study the effects on these hazards of changes in minimum retirement
age and in the strictness of employment protection legislation. We find an interesting
contrast between the Northern and Central European countries and the Mediterranean
countries in our sample. In the former group, policies that raise minimum retirement
age and reduce employment protection have increased the hazard into gradual retire-
ment. In the latter group, these policies have reduced the hazard into permanent retire-
ment without significantly affecting gradual retirement. Therefore, permanence into
career jobs has increased. These results suggest that both policies have contributed to
increase the labour supply of older workers and to improve the sustainability of pension
systems. This has been attained by transitions into bridge jobs in Northern and Central
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We speculate that this difference is due both to the fewer opportunities to work part-
time and to the lower average human capital of older workers in the latter group of
countries.
The paper is organized as follows. We start by reviewing the relevant literature
(Section “Introduction”). Section “Previous literature” introduces the data, the key defi-
nitions and the descriptive evidence on bridge jobs in Continental Europe based on
SHARE. Finally, Section “Bridge jobs in Europe” presents our estimates of the effects of
changes in minimum retirement age and employment protection on the hazards from
career jobs to gradual and permanent retirement. Conclusions follow.
Previous literature
The decreasing trend in the average retirement age observed during the last decades
and the contextual increase in life expectancy in almost all industrialised countries
(Gruber and Wise, 1997) have motivated the economic analysis of individual behaviour
during the last years of a labour market history. The traditional view of retirement is
that employed individuals move directly from their career employment to complete re-
tirement (Kantarci and Van Soest, 2008). Yet this needs not be a direct transition, but
could involve less traditional pathways, such as the reduction of working hours in the
same job or moving to a different and often less demanding job before retirement.
In the US, these less traditional patterns are by no means an exception. Gustman and
Steinmeier, 1984, use the Retirement History Study (RHS) to estimate that at least one
third of white employees in the US move from employment to partial retirement.
Honig and Hanoch, 1985, confirm the importance of gradual retirement among older
American workers. Using the US Social Security Administration Retirement History
Longitudinal Survey, Ruhm, 1990, shows that the vast majority of US workers leaving
their career job before age 55 remains in the labour force for at least one additional
decade. He defines the jobs held after a career job and before retirement as bridge jobs,
or jobs that act as bridges from career work to full time retirement. While career and
bridge jobs are typically in a different industry or occupation, older workers engaged in
bridge jobs show a high degree of job stability.
Blau, 1994, looks at the dynamics of labour force participation for older men in the
US and models their transitions using a discrete time hazard model. He confirms that
labour market transitions after age 50 are more frequent than usually thought and finds
that they are affected by social security benefits. Quinn, 1996, reports that individual
characteristics such as age, health and marital status affects the choice of the exit path
from the labour force. Cahill, Giandrea, and Quinn, 2005, 2006, show that a key factor
affecting the pattern of labour market withdrawal is the type of job done. For instance,
the self-employed are more likely to leave their career job for a bridge job. Peracchi
and Welch, 1994, document the presence of substantial gender differences in the prob-
ability of doing a bridge job. They also suggest that those engaged in these jobs belong
to two broad groups, those who look for a more satisfying career and those forced to
work by their financial hardships.
There is much less empirical evidence on the importance of bridge jobs in Europe.
Kantarci and Van Soest, 2008, is the only paper we are aware of in this area of research.
They review the few existing country studies and present European evidence on
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ever, do not allow them to measure the frequency of bridge jobs using definitions
similar to those applied in the US. Therefore, their comparative perspective is
rather limited.
Bridge jobs in Europe
Following Ruhm, 1990, and Cahill et al., 2006, we define a career job as a full-time job
that started before age 50 and lasted at least 10 years, and a bridge job as a job that
started around age 50 after a career job and lasted less than 10 years5. When job spells
are completed, their duration is obvious. When they are on-going or interrupted, we
can only measure their duration until the time of the survey. Partly following Quinn,
1996, we estimate the completed duration of interrupted spells as the maximum be-
tween twice the interrupted duration and the duration until modal retirement age6. To
illustrate with an example, assume that an individual aged 60 is observed on an on-
going job after his career job, and that the observed duration of this job is three years.
Assume also that modal retirement age in his country and for his cohort of birth is 62.
We estimate the completed length of the current job spell as the minimum bet-
ween 6 – twice the interrupted length – and 5, the completed length by the time
of modal retirement.
Using the convention that jobs that have lasted less than 10 years are short-term jobs,
bridge jobs are short-term jobs and career jobs are long-term jobs. Clearly, not all
short-term jobs held from age 50 to 70 originate from a career job. Some of these jobs
have started from another short-term job when the individual moves across a sequence
on non-career jobs, or from unemployment and out of the labour force. To identify
whether a short-term job is a bridge job, additional information is required on the du-
ration of the previous job. This information is available on a European scale in the third
wave of the survey SHARE.
The survey SHARE is a multidisciplinary and cross-national European dataset which
contains current and retrospective information on labour market activity, retirement,
health and socioeconomic status for more than 25,000 individuals aged 50 or older.
The design of the survey and its questionnaires are similar to those employed by the
Health and Retirement Study (HRS) in the US and the English Longitudinal Survey of
Adults (ELSA). A distinctive advantage of these data is that they cover a significant
number of countries in Continental Europe. We use the third wave of the survey, which
includes detailed data on the entire working life of interviewed individuals. This is valu-
able but comes at the price that it is based on retrospective information. However, as
discussed in detail by Brunello, Weber and Weiss (2012), existing validation studies
find that recall bias is not so severe, arguably because of the state-of-the-art elicitation
methods used: respondents are helped to locate events along the time line, starting
from domains that are more easily remembered, and then asked progressively more de-
tails about them.
We consider male individuals who, at the time of the survey (2008–09), were aged
between 55 and 70 and reconstruct their working life from age 50 to the time of the
interview, using the retrospective information on all job changes that occurred since
labour market entry. Our sample consists of 5148 males from 10 countries (Austria,
Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, Denmark, Switzerland and
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age 50 – a full-time job which started before age 50, was not finished before that age,
and had a completed duration of at least 10 years7 – close to 7% had instead a short-
term job or were in an unemployment spell leading to a short-term job, defined as a
job with a completed duration shorter than 10 years, close to 2% were in a part - time
job longer than 10 years, and the remaining 6% were either retired or in an unemploy-
ment spell leading to retirement8.
Table 1 shows that 8.86% of the workers who were in a career job at age 50 have ex-
perienced at least one bridge job in the following years, 0.71% have moved from a full-
time to a part-time job with the same employer, 51.3% have exited directly into per-
manent retirement, and the remaining 38.90% were still in the career job at the time of
the interview. The percentage of male individuals experiencing one or more bridge jobs
is 6.45% in Mediterranean Europe (France, Italy and Spain) and 10.52% in the rest of
the sample, which includes Central and Northern European countries. We find that
transitions from full to part-time work with the same employer are relatively more fre-
quent in the latter group of countries, and that direct transitions from a career job to
retirement are much more frequent in Mediterranean Europe (58.32% versus 48.20% in
Northern and Central Europe). When we break down the 55 to 70 age group into two
sub-groups (55 to 64 and 65 to 70), we find that the percentage of individuals who
have experienced at least one bridge job is higher in the younger age group (9.40%
versus 7.97%).
It is useful to compare these results with similar analysis for the United States. Quinn
et al., 2006, use data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and a definition of
bridge jobs very similar to ours. They show that close to 60% of the American males
aged 51 to 61 in 1992 who exited a career job moved to a bridge job9. In sharp con-
trast, the corresponding percentage for male Europeans in our sample aged 55 to 64 in
2008/9 is 14.6% (8.86/(8.86 + 51.53) in Table 1), and as low as 9.9% in Mediterranean
Europe. While these percentages may be affected by cohort and macroeconomicTable 1 Transitions from a career job









Full Sample 38.90 0.71 8.86 51.53
Northern Europe 40.78 0.99 10.04 48.20
Mediterranean Europe 35.09 0.14 6.45 58.32
Age group 55-64
Full Sample 57.05 0.88 9.40 32.67
Northern Europe 60.30 1.22 10.52 27.96
Mediterranean Europe 50.65 0.22 7.19 41.94
Age group 65-70
Full Sample 9.06 0.42 7.97 82.55
Northern Europe 9.63 0.62 9.28 80.48
Mediterranean Europe 7.82 - 5.15 87.02
Males only. Age groups: 55–70, 55–64 and 65–70.
Source: our computations from the third wave of the survey SHARE.
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move directly into retirement to a much higher extent than older Americans.
Table 2 considers labour market transitions by level of education (at most 12 year or
higher than 12 years). We find that both in Northern/Central and in Mediterranean
Europe better educated individuals are less likely to move directly from a career job to
permanent retirement and more likely to take up a bridge job or to switch from full to
part - time work than less educated individuals. The table suggests that one reason why
transitions to gradual retirement are higher in Northern/Central Europe is that older
workers tend to be better educated than in Mediterranean Europe10.
Table 3 shows the self-reported reasons why individuals aged 55 to 70 left a career
job and moved to a bridge job. We organize these reasons into four categories:
a) resigned or mutual agreement; b) layoff, plant closure or end of temporary job;
c) retirement; d) else. Broadly speaking, category a) includes mainly voluntary separa-
tions and category b) is for involuntary separations. The table suggests that close to
one third of the transitions to a bridge job or to retirement in Europe occur because of
layoffs, plant closures and terminations of temporary jobs. This percentage increases to
close to 44% in the Mediterranean countries in our sample.
Most individuals aged between 55 and 70 who changed from a career to a bridge job
have had a single new job (81.1%), and only slightly more than 5% have had three or
more new jobs (see bottom part of Table 3). Among the individuals who have experi-
enced a bridge job, 42% did not change both industry and occupation, almost 30%
changed either occupation or industry and 28% changed both. These percentages sug-
gest that changes of industry or occupation are less frequent in Europe than in the US.
In his study of bridge jobs, Ruhm, (1990), found that only 24% of older Americans
remained in the same occupation and industry, and 51% changed either occupation or
industry11.
We have found important differences in the prevalence of bridge jobs among diffe-
rent European countries (Northern and Central versus Mediterranean) and groups of
individuals (less versus more educated). Demand, supply and institutional factors are
likely to affect these differences. On the demand side, the availability of part-time jobs
for older workers is much higher in Northern than in Southern Europe. According
to Eurostat, in 2007 the percentage of male employees aged 50 to 64 who was in aTable 2 Transitions from a career job









At Most 12 Years of Schooling 33.16 0.39 7.67 58.78
More Than 12 Years of Schooling 46.96 1.15 10.53 41.36
Northern Europe
At Most 12 Years of Schooling 35.13 0.66 8.86 55.35
More Than 12 Years of Schooling 46.86 1.34 11.31 40.49
Mediterranean Europe
At Most 12 Years of Schooling 30.27 - 5.90 63.83
More Than 12 Years of Schooling 47.30 0.49 7.84 44.36
By education. Males only. Age: 55–70.
Source: our computations from the third wave of the survey SHARE.
Table 3 Reasons to move to a bridge job and number and types of job changes after
leaving the full time career job
Reason why CJ was stopped All Countries Mediterranean Countries
Resigned or mutual consent 36.75 29.55




0 1 2 3+
Number of bridge jobs after a career job - 81.15 13.61 5.24
Changes in occupation after a career job 56.02 38.22 4.71 1.05
Changes of job industry after a career job 57.59 35.60 5.50 1.31
Men aged 55–70. All European and Mediterranean countries.
Source: see Table 2.
Brunello and Langella IZA Journal of Labor Policy Page 7 of 182013, 2:11
http://www.izajolp.com/content/2/1/11part-time job was as low as 2.9 percent in Spain and as high as 22.5 percent in the
Netherlands. On the supply side, the willingness and the ability to gradually rather than
permanently retiring depends on the quantity and quality of human capital, which is
acquired both at school and in the labour market (training). According to the OECD,
2006, the percentage of employed individuals aged 50 to 64 who participated to training
during the previous 12 months was smallest in Spain and Italy and largest in
Switzerland, Sweden and Denmark. These demand and supply factors suggest that tran-
sitions from career jobs to gradual retirement should be less frequent in Mediterranean
Europe.
Institutional rules that regulate the calculation of pension benefits also differ among
countries and affect the incentives to use gradual retirement. For instance, as reported
by the OECD, 2006, the net replacement rate for full career workers – measured as the
ratio of net pension entitlements to net average earnings - is higher in Italy and Spain
than in Denmark, Germany and The Netherlands, and favours transitions into perma-
nent retirement in the former group of countries.
Since countries differ because of a wide range of observable and unobservable charac-
teristics, the identification of the effects of economic institutions on the labour market
transitions of older workers is difficult if not impossible using cross section data. To
better illustrate this point, consider employment protection legislation, which can have
two opposite effects on labour market outcomes. Stricter protection can lead both to
greater retention of workers because it raises firing costs and to fewer hirings because
it raises hiring costs. The OECD, 2006, plots the employment rate of men aged 50 to
64 against the strictness of employment protection in a number of member countries,
and shows that there is a negative and statistically significant correlation. Yet the omis-
sion of country – specific effects that can affect both employment protection and em-
ployment rates implies that this correlation does not inform us of the presence of a
causal relationship. One way to control for the host of time invariant country – specific
effects is to use longitudinal data and focus on the variations of institutional rules over
time. In the next section of this paper, we focus on two such rules, minimum retire-
ment age and employment protection legislation, and exploit their within – country
variations to study the effects on the labour market transitions of older workers12.
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protection on the probability of gradual retirement
Several European countries have experienced during the 1990s and the 2000s impor-
tant changes in their labour market institutions. In this section, we focus on two such
institutions, employment protection legislation and minimum early retirement age, and
restrict our attention to the sub-sample of countries included in SHARE which have
experienced changes in minimum retirement age during the period 1992 to 2008.
These countries are: Austria, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Sweden. In
Austria and Sweden, minimum early retirement age increased from 60 to 61 in 2002
and 2007 respectively. In the Netherlands and Spain, minimum age increased from 60
to 62 in 1995 and 1994. In Switzerland, the increase from 62 to 63 years occurred in
2007. In Italy, there were several increases from 1996 to 2007, with minimum age rising
progressively from 52 to 57 years (see Table 5 in the Appendix for further details). In
all these countries, with the exception of Switzerland, the strictness of employment
protection legislation has declined over the sample period, as illustrated by Figure 113.
In order to study the effects of exogenous changes in employment protection and
early retirement age on the labour market behaviour of older workers who were in a
career job at age 50, we use the retrospective data from SHARE to reconstruct for each
male individual aged 55 to 70 at the time of the interview the annual records of his
labour market status, starting from age 50. We pool data from the six countries over
the period 1992–2008, match them with data on minimum retirement age and employ-
ment protection for the same period and use a survival data approach. We focus on
men who, at the age of 50, were holding a full-time career job. In this approach, career
employment at age 50 is treated as the initial (survival) status and the transitions














































































1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
year
Employment Protection Legislation (epl), by Country
Figure 1 Employment Protection Legislation, 1992–2008.
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logit model of competing risks, where the baseline category is the censored event
(still in a career job).
Define Wit as a variable taking the value 0 if the individual i is in a full-time career
job at time t, 1 if he is in gradual retirement, and 2 if he has permanently retired. To
capture the effects of minimum early retirement age RAt on the decisions to perman-
ently retire or take up gradual retirement, we define the variable Zit as equal to zero if
RAt is lower than or equal to individual age Ait and to RAt −Ait if RAt is higher than
Ait. The variable Zit indicates that individuals older than or as old as the minimum
early retirement age are not constrained by RAt in their retirement decisions (Zit = 0).
On the other hand, individuals younger than RAt are affected by minimum retirement
age because they can retire only after reaching it (Zit > 0). Minimum early retirement
age in Europe has varied between the early 50s and the early 60s during the past twenty
years. In our data, the variable Zit ranges from 0 to 13. Since we use data for individuals
aged 55 to 70 at the time of the interview, our sample includes for each country both
constrained (Zit > 0) and unconstrained individuals (Zit = 0).
We treat both gradual and permanent retirement as absorbing states and - for each
individual in the sample who attains either state at time t – we drop all observations
from time t + 1 onwards. We estimate the following regression model
Wit ¼ α0 þ α1Ait þ α1A2it þ β1Zitc þ β2Ect þ γGct þ δXi þ θc þ θs þ εit ð1Þ
where Ait is individual age, Ect is the index of strictness of employment protection legis-
lation, Gct is a vector of country by time effects – the log real GDP per capita, the na-
tional unemployment rate and life expectancy at age 50 - Xi is a vector of individual
time invariant effects, which includes personal as well as job characteristics at age 50,
θc and θs are country and cohort dummies, εit is the error term, c is for the country,
i for the individual and s for cohort. By including country dummies, we control in a
flexible way for the effects of all time invariant labour market institutions that can
affect the labour market transitions of older workers. We are interested in estimating
the effects of Zitc and Ect on the hazard to gradual and permanent retirement, using as
baseline the probability of being in a full-time career job15. We also take into account
the fact that some covariates are defined at a higher level of aggregation than the
dependent variable by clustering standard errors by country and time. Table 6 in the
Appendix show the summary statistics of the relevant covariates.
Table 4 presents our estimates both for the full sample of six countries and for the
two sub-samples of Northern/Central and Mediterranean countries. The table reports
only the estimated relative risk ratios for the two key variables, employment protection
E and minimum retirement age Z16. The estimates of the other covariates are reported
in Table 8 in the Appendix. Consider first the results for the full sample – columns (1)
and (2) of the table. On the one hand, we find that changes in either employment pro-
tection or in minimum retirement age have had no statistically significant impact on
gradual retirement. On the other hand, there is evidence that a one-year increase in
minimum retirement age has had a negative and statistically significant impact on the
hazard into permanent retirement.
Next, consider the two sub-samples of Northern/Central and Mediterranean countries
in columns (3) to (6) of the table. In the former case, we estimate that, for gradual



















Z 0.945 0.784*** 1.548** 0.845 0.959 0.860***




0.843 0.935 0.286** 0.854 0.522 1.355*
[0.275] [0.156] [0.164] [0.397] [0.219] [0.224]
Cohort
dummies
YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country
dummies
YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 19,178 19,178 11,821 11,821 7,357 7,357
6 European Countries. Males aged 55–70. Relative risk ratios.
Note: standard errors clustered by country and time within brackets. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.001.
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1.548 and 0.286 respectively (statistically significant at the 5% level of confidence),
suggesting that both the increases in minimum retirement age and the reductions
in the strictness of employment protection legislation have produced more exits
into gradual retirement. In these countries, we find no statistical significant effect
of either Z or E on exits into permanent retirement. Conversely, in the case of
Mediterranean countries, we find no statistically significant effect of Z and E on
exits into gradual retirement, and statistically significant effects on exits to perma-
nent retirement. In particular, we find that a marginal increase in Z and in E have
respectively reduced (estimated value: 0.860, statistically significant at the 1%) and
increased (estimated value: 1.355, statistically significant at the 10%) the hazard
into permanent retirement. These findings suggest that older male workers in
Mediterranean countries have reacted to higher minimum retirement age and to
lower employment protection by increasing their permanence into career jobs, ra-
ther than by taking up bridge jobs with other employers, as done by their col-
leagues in Northern and Central Europe.
Conclusions
We have used European data from the Survey on Health, Ageing and Retirement in
Europe (SHARE) to present new evidence on the diffusion of bridge jobs in Continental
Europe. We have shown that almost 9% of the European males in our sample aged 55
to 70 at the time of the interview (2008/09) have moved from a career to a bridge
job on their way to (eventual) retirement, that less than 1% have switched from a
full to a part-time schedule with the same employer, that about 51% have moved
directly from a career job to permanent retirement, and that the remaining 39%
have remained in their career job at the time of the interview. We have also shown
that the traditional patterns of retirement – a move from a career job to perman-
ent withdrawal from the labour force – are much more frequent in Mediterranean
Europe (Italy, France and Spain) than in Northern and Central Europe (Germany,
Austria, Switzerland, Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Sweden). These percentages
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less frequent in Continental Europe than in the US or in Japan, where it involves the ma-
jority of older workers.
We have studied the effects of changes in minimum early retirement age and in the
strictness of employment protection on the hazards from career jobs to gradual and
permanent retirement by estimating a discrete competing hazard model with two haz-
ards. Our a priori expectations were that less restrictive employment protection could
have affected the hazard into bridge jobs by increasing the availability of short-term
contracts with shorter working hours. We also expected to find that higher minimum
retirement age, by delaying retirement, could have induced individuals wishing to con-
sume additional leisure to switch from more demanding career jobs to bridge jobs. Our
findings suggest that these expectations are correct only for our sample of older
workers in Northern and Central European countries. In Mediterranean Europe, our
results suggest that these policies have induced older workers to stay on in their full
time career jobs.
What are the sources of these cross country differences? While a detailed investiga-
tion is beyond the scope of the current paper, we believe that plausible candidate fac-
tors are: a) on the demand side, the relative scarcity of part-time jobs available to the
specific age group in Mediterranean countries; b) on the supply side, the lower level of
human capital (both education and training) owned on average by older workers in
Mediterranean countries, which hampers mobility and the flexibility required to profit-
ably change jobs before retirement.
Endnotes
1While we focus in this paper on employment protection and minimum retirement
age, we acknowledge that other policies, including how earnings in the last years are
counted in determining pension benefits and the existence of generalized partial pen-
sion schemes that allow for a combination of part-time work and a partial pension, can
affect transitions into retirement. Yet, insofar as these policies vary slowly or not at all
over time, their effects on the variables of interest is absorbed in our analysis by coun-
try fixed effects.
2In Japan the prevalence of bridge jobs is due to mandatory retirement.
3Since we do not observe working hours, our data are silent on other forms of phased
retirement that imply a reduction in hours with the same employer, without a formal
switch from full to part-time.
4Older workers holding a part-time job in our sample are either those who were not
in a career job at age 50 because they were already in a part - time job or in a short -
term job at that age – or those who held a career job and switched to a bridge job. In
our sample of men aged 55 to 70 at the time of the interview, 8.88% did not have a career
job at age 50. Of these, 21.44% had at least one part - time job during their career.
5The definition of a career job in the US usually include both a tenure component
and a full time work component during this tenure. In this paper, we adopt this defin-
ition. Results which include the small fraction of part-time career jobs are reported in
Table 7 in the Appendix.
6Under stable economic conditions, on-going or interrupted spells are on average
halfway through their full length at the time of a survey (Salant, 1977).
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/2/1/117Following Cahill et al., 2006, when a career job is followed by another job longer
than 10 years, we consider the last job as the relevant career job.
8In this study we assign all temporary inactivity spells due, for example, to unemploy-
ment, either to the job spells occurring after inactivity, if the individual finds a job, or
to retirement, if she retires from the labour market. While we acknowledge that labour
market re-entry after temporary retirement can be an important feature of labour mar-
ket transitions, our data do not allow to measure re-entry in an accurate manner.
9See also Ruhm, 1990.
10Average years of schooling in our sample are 12.6 in Northern and Central Europe
and 9.8 in Mediterranean Europe.
11These percentages are not strictly comparable to ours, because Ruhm refers to both
males and females, while we only consider males.
12The focus on time varying institutions naturally restricts the range of rules and pol-
icies that we can examine, also because of data availability.
13Our results are not qualitatively affected by the exclusion of Switzerland from the
sample. The OECD indicator of employment protection refers to the protection of
regular employment and the regulation of temporary work and is intended to measure
the strictness of EPL. More precisely, since most of the literature on employment pro-
tection emphasises the analogy of EPL to an employer-borne tax on employment ad-
justment, the overall intent is to reflect the cost implications of various regulatory
provisions for employers (i.e. stricter is interpreted as more costly). The overall sum-
mary measure of EPL strictness relies on three main components related to protection
of regular workers against (individual) dismissal, specific requirements for collective
dismissals and regulation of temporary forms of employment. See OECD, 2004.
14Transitions to gradual retirement are moves from a career to a bridge job and from
full to part-time within the same career job.
15We also explore whether the two institutions are complements or substitutes in
their effects on both hazards but find little evidence of significant interactions.
16The relative risk ratio is the exponentiated value of the estimated coefficient of the
variable of interest in a multinomial logit setup. Values larger than one and smaller
than one indicate that the marginal effect of the relevant covariate on the selected ha-
zard is positive and negative respectively.
17UN data available at data.un.org/Data.aspx?d = UNESCO&f = series%3ATHAGE_1
18The structure of the European education systems 2010/11: schematic diagrams.
Available at eacea.ec.europa.eu/education/eurydice/documents/tools/108EN.pdf
Appendix
We collect data on changes in minimum early retirement age from several data
sources, which include Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti (www.frdb.org), the OECD
(2011) and Angelini, Brugiavini, and Weber (2009). Results for our sample of six
countries are reported in Table 5 below.
The sources of data for the covariates used in the multinomial analysis are:
– unemployment rate: Eurostat, the Statistic Database (lfsa_urgaed series)
– life expectancy at the age of 50: Eurostat, the Statistic Database
(demo_mlexpec series)
Table 5 Minimum early retirement age from 1992 to 2008




Italy 1992-1995 50 for the private sector and 40 for the public sector (the requirement
was 35 and 25 years of contributions respectively and minimum age
to start working was 15)
1996-1997 40 for the public sector, 52 for the private sector, 56 for the self employed
1998-2000 57 for self employed
54 in 1998 and 55 in 1999 and 2000 for the private sector, 53 in 1998
and 1999 and 54 in 2000 for the public sector
2001 58 for self-employed
56 for the private sector and 55 for the public sector
2002-2007 58 for self-employed
57 for the private sector
55 in 2002, 56 in 2003 and 57 in 2004 in the public sector
2008 60








Sources: Angelini, Brugiavini, and Weber (2009); OECD (2011); Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti.
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/2/1/11– logarithm of per capita GDP. Source: OECD.
– years of schooling. Calculated as the difference between the age when full-time
education ends (from SHARE) and the age when compulsory school starts
(Source: United Nations18 and Eurydice19)
– married: dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is or has ever been
married (source: SHARE)
– children: dummy variable indicating whether the respondent has at least one child
(source: SHARE)
– ill at 50: dummy variable indicating whether, at age 50, the respondent had ill
health (source: SHARE)
– stressed at 50: dummy variable indicating whether the respondent was in a period
of stress at age 50 (source: SHARE)
– poor health at 50: dummy variable indicating whether the respondent was in a
period of poor health at age 50 (source: SHARE)
– financial hardship at 50: dummy variable indicating whether the respondent was
in a period of financial hardship at age 50 (source: SHARE)
– living in rural area at 50: dummy variable indicating whether the respondent was
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/2/1/11– job at 50 full time: dummy variable indicating whether the job the respondent was
doing at age 50 (the career job) was a full-time job (source: SHARE)
– job at 50 services: dummy variable indicating whether the job the respondent
was doing at age 50 (the CJ in this case) was in the services sector
(source: SHARE)ble 6 Summary statistics for the country specific macro variables







employment rate (Eurostat) 6.33 4.65 8.96
e Expectancy at 50 (Eurostat) 29 28.95 29.08
g of GDP per capita (OECD) 9.88 9.97 9.75






mmy: stressed at 50 0.17
(0.006)
mmy: poor health at 50 0.07
(0.004)
mmy: financial hardship at 50 0.05
(0.003)
mmy: living in a rural area at 50 0.35
(0.007)
b at 50: full time 0.97
(0.002)
b at 50: in the 3rd industry 0.57
(0.008)
b at 50: blue collar 0.41
(0.008)
b at 50: self employed 0.16
(0.005)
b at 50: civil servant 0.19
(0.006)




ars of working experience at 50 43.12
(0.375)
mmy: few books when child 0.60
(0.007)
urce: OECD and SHARE. Standard errors within parentheses.
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/2/1/11– job at 50 blue collar: dummy variable indicating whether the respondent was in a
blue collar job at age 50 (source: SHARE)
– job at 50 public sector: dummy variable indicating whether the respondent was
employed in the public sector at age 50 (source: SHARE)
– job at 50 self-employed: dummy variable indicating whether the respondent was
working as self-employed at age 50 (source: SHARE)
– experience at 50: years of working experience cumulated at age 50. The
variable is calculated as the sum of the years in which the respondent
declares to have been working since the year when the first job started
(source: SHARE)
– fewbooks: dummy indicating whether the respondent had less than 25 books
during childhood (source: SHARE)
– log population at 50: the logarithm of the population aged 55-64 in each year and
country (Source: Eurostat, Statistic Database)
Table 6 presents summary statistics for the individual and country specific macro var-
iables used in the regressions. Table 7 replicates Table 1 by adding the small fraction of
individuals in part-time career jobs. Finally, Table 8 is an enlarged version of Table 4,








Full Sample 40.18 8.74 51.08
Northern Europe 42.40 9.87 47.73
Mediterranean Europe 35.63 6.40 57.97
Age group 55-64
Full Sample 58.24 9.27 32.49
Northern Europe 61.76 10.34 27.91
Mediterranean Europe 51.23 7.15 42.03
Age group 65-70
Full Sample 10.10 7.84 82.06
Northern Europe 11.02 9.11 88.98
Mediterranean Europe 8.10 5.08 86.82
Full Sample
At Most 12 Years of Schooling 34.23 7.64 58.14
More Than 12 Years of Schooling 48.43 10.26 41.31
Northern Europe
At Most 12 Years of Schooling 36.57 8.87 54.56
More Than 12 Years of Schooling 48.60 10.94 40.46
Mediterranean Europe
At Most 12 Years of Schooling 30.76 5.81 63.43
More Than 12 Years of Schooling 47.85 7.84 44.26
Males aged 55–70. Transitions by age and by education. Including part-time jobs in the definition of career jobs.













Z 0.945 0.784*** 1.548** 0.845 0.959 0.860***
[0.077] [0.028] [0.313] [0.092] [0.109] [0.046]
Employment protection index 0.843 0.935 0.286** 0.854 0.522 1.355*
[0.275] [0.156] [0.164] [0.397] [0.219] [0.224]
Macro controls
Log real GDP per capita 0.593 9.450* 0.001** 0.945 8.716 16.068*
[1.444] [11.153] [0.002] [2.738] [43.579] [24.310]
Unemployment rate 0.952 1.078** 0.973 1.091 0.814 1.065
[0.069] [0.037] [0.105] [0.077] [0.110] [0.061]
Life expectation at 50 1.064 0.990 1.353 0.866 0.653 1.307*
[0.274] [0.149] [0.439] [0.199] [0.290] [0.209]
Individual controls
Years of schooling 1.022 0.959*** 1.027 0.959*** 1.014 0.953***
[0.022] [0.007] [0.027] [0.013] [0.036] [0.009]
Marital status 0.886 0.900 0.739 0.935 2.247 0.789
[0.222] [0.109] [0.204] [0.144] [1.203] [0.202]
Has children 1.520 0.807* 1.719* 0.772 0.854 0.959
[0.440] [0.100] [0.538] [0.122] [0.510] [0.230]
Was ill at 50 0.958 1.611** 1.033 2.129*** 0.914 1.016
[0.341] [0.313] [0.418] [0.509] [0.661] [0.335]
Was stressed at 50 1.481* 1.397*** 1.473 1.354** 1.886* 1.580*
[0.321] [0.172] [0.396] [0.203] [0.725] [0.399]
Was in poor health at 50 1.079 1.293* 1.236 1.395** 0.567 1.235


















Table 8 Multinomial logit for discrete survival data (Baseline: Full Time Career Job) (Continued)
Was in financial distress at 50 1.341 0.920 0.779 0.881 2.884** 0.855
[0.407] [0.166] [0.344] [0.229] [1.468] [0.229]
Lived in rural area at 50 0.788 0.952 0.799 0.957 0.819 0.968
[0.135] [0.079] [0.163] [0.097] [0.237] [0.142]
Job in services at 50 0.681* 0.993 0.763 1.262** 0.523* 0.815
[0.136] [0.086] [0.179] [0.145] [0.190] [0.103]
Blue collar job at 50 0.867 1.060 0.807 1.199 0.923 0.962
[0.172] [0.079] [0.219] [0.141] [0.316] [0.097]
Civil servant job at 50 0.839 1.314** 0.859 1.485*** 0.333 0.964
[0.241] [0.148] [0.265] [0.207] [0.342] [0.208]
Self-employed at 50 0.907 0.328*** 0.800 0.412*** 1.061 0.284***
[0.169] [0.039] [0.191] [0.080] [0.318] [0.044]
Work experience at 50 0.992* 0.996** 0.994 1.000 0.989* 0.992***
[0.004] [0.002] [0.005] [0.003] [0.006] [0.002]
Had few books in the house at 10 1.097 1.177 1.121 1.188 0.995 1.049
[0.231] [0.124] [0.261] [0.150] [0.493] [0.198]
Age 1.106 0.500** 6.413* 0.509 1.353 0.970
[0.722] [0.147] [6.673] [0.332] [1.038] [0.447]
Age squared 0.999 1.007*** 0.988 1.008 0.996 1.001
[0.005] [0.003] [0.008] [0.005] [0.006] [0.004]
Cohort dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 19,178 19,178 11,821 11,821 7,357 7,357
6 European Countries. Males aged 55–70. Relative risk ratios. All covariates.


















Brunello and Langella IZA Journal of Labor Policy Page 18 of 182013, 2:11
http://www.izajolp.com/content/2/1/11Competing interests
The IZA Journal of Labor Policy is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity. The authors declare
that they have observed these principles.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to an anonymous referee and to participants at a seminar in Padova for comments. This paper uses
data from SHARELIFE release 1, as of November 24th 2010 and SHARE release 2.5.0, as of May 24th 2011. The SHARE
data collection has been primarily funded by the European Commission through the 5th framework program (project
QLK6-CT-2001- 00360 in the thematic program Quality of Life), through the 6th framework program (projects SHARE-I3,
RII-CT-2006-062193, COMPARE, CIT5-CT-2005-028857, and SHARELIFE, CIT4-CT-2006-028812) and through the 7th
framework program (SHARE-PREP, 211909 and SHARE-LEAP, 227822). Additional funding from the U.S. National Institute
on Aging (U01 AG09740-13S2, P01 AG005842, P01 AG08291, P30 AG12815, Y1-AG-4553-01 and OGHA 04–064,
IAG BSR06-11, R21 AG025169) as well as from various national sources is gratefully acknowledged. The usual
disclaimer applies.
Responsible editor: Juan F Jimeno
Author details
1Department of Economics, University of Padova, Padova, Italy. 2Department of Economics, University of Verona,
Verona, Italy.
Received: 31 May 2013 Accepted: 13 August 2013
Published:
References
23 Sep 2013Angelini V, Brugiavini A, Weber W (2009) Ageing and unused capacity in Europe: is there an early retirement trap? Econ
Policy 4(59):463–508
Blau DM (1994) Labor force dynamics of older Men. Econometrica 62(1):117–156
Brunello G, Weber G, Weiss C (2012) Books are Forever. Early Life Conditions, Education and Lifetime Earnings in
Europe”. IZA Discussion Papers 6386, Bonn
Cahill KE, Giandrea MD, Quinn JF (2005) Are traditional retirements a thing of the past? New evidence on retirement
patterns and bridge jobs. In: BLS Working paper no. 384., Washington, DC
Cahill KE, Giandrea MD, Quinn JF (2006) ‘Down Shifting: The Role of Bridge Jobs after Career Employment. Issue Brief
no.06. The Center on Aging and Work. Workplace, Boston College, Boston
Gruber J, Wise D (1997) Social Security Programs and Retirement Around the World, NBER Working Paper No. 6134.
Gustman AL, Steinmeier TL (1984) Partial retirement and the analysis of retirement behaviour. Industrial Labor Relations
535 Rev 37(3):403–415
Honig M, Hanoch G (1985) Partial retirement as a separate mode of retirement behaviour. J Hum Resour 20(1):21–46
Jenkins SP (2005) Survival Analysis using Stata, Essex University., https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/resources/survival-analysis-
with-stata
Kantarci T, Van Soest A (2008) Gradual retirement: preferences and limitations. De Economist 156(No. 2):113–144
OECD (2004) Employment Outlook. OECD Publishing, Paris
OECD (2006) Live Longer, Work Longer. OECD Publishing, Paris
OECD (2011) Pensions at a Glance 2011. Retirement-Income Systems in OECD and G20 Countries’, OECD Publishing.,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/pension_glance-2011-en
Peracchi F, Welch F (1994) Trends in labour force transitions of older Men and women. J Labour Econ 12(2):210–242
Quinn JF (1996) “The Role of Bridge Jobs in the Retirement Patterns of Older Americans in the 1990s”, Boston College
Working Papers in Economics no. 324. Boston College, Boston
Ruhm CJ (1990) Bridge jobs and partial retirement. J Labour Econ 8(4):482–501
Salant SW (1977) Search theory and duration data: a theory of sorts. Quart J Econ 91(1):39–57Cite this article as: Brunello and Langella: Bridge jobs in Europe. IZA Journal of Labor Policy
10.1186/2193-9004-2-11
2013, 2:11Submit your manuscript to a 
journal and beneﬁ t from:
7 Convenient online submission
7 Rigorous peer review
7 Immediate publication on acceptance
7 Open access: articles freely available online
7 High visibility within the ﬁ eld
7 Retaining the copyright to your article
    Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropen.com
